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REFLECTIONS ON THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF AMERICAN INDIANS
Professor Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reporter for the Restatement
34TH ANNUAL INDIAN LAW SYMPOSIUM
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS
APRIL 21, 2022
INTRODUCTION
I’ve been asked to talk about and give some reflections about the
Restatement project. And I’m going to start by telling a story about my
family. I’m a descendant of a man named Leopold Pokagon. He is the
namesake for which the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians here in
Michigan is named. He’s a great, great, great grandfather of mine. I don’t
know how many greats, but several. And also, just a legendary figure.
There are many stories about Leopold. He’s the reason that the Pokagon
Potawatomi Nation is not either terminated, extinguished, or residing
somewhere in Iowa or Oklahoma.
He was a true leader in that he saved his tribe from removal to the West.
From extinction really. His name is sort of anglicized, it doesn’t sound
like Pokagon. There’s a funny story about his name, which is that it was
a nickname and from some telling, not a real generous nickname. The
word Pokagon comes from, in the Potawatomi, Poké-igan, which means
rib. And it seems odd to call somebody rib. But think about what a rib
does, where it’s located on the human body. It’s a shield. It’s a shield
protecting primarily the heart and lungs. And if you look at the image
behind me, which is an Anishinaabe image representing the seven clans.
Seven clans of Anishinaabe people, they’re all connected by those little
strings, and you can see the little red dots. Those are the heart. That’s the
démen, the heart, which is also the same word for strawberry because they
kind of look the same and that’s what he was known for. He was a
protector.
And when I think about the Restatement, I think about what work a rib
does. One of the goals that we had, when we moved forward with this
project, was to highlight the duty of protection, in some respects, to protect
Indian law. And to elevate what we know is the trust responsibility as
more legalistic, highly symbolic, and enforceable trust duty.
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We got to know a lot of people over this period of time. We drew upon
friendships. We leaned heavily on people to work on this thing with us. It
was a 10-year project and I never thought I would be saying I’d be
working on something for 10 years because my attention span is so short.
Eric said I finished the project quickly because if I didn’t finish it right
away, it would never get done.
REMARKS
So, let’s talk a little bit about the substantive reflection I wanted to
make about the Restatement, which has everything to do with the duty of
protection, and the trust responsibility. You might ask, what work does
the Restatement do in a field populated by, say, Felix Cohen, the Cohen
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, which is the gold star and gold standard
for treatises, really not just in Indian law but pretty much anywhere. Well,
I’d like to think that it’s one of the things we’re trying to advocate for
through this for this process is we have to be very subtle.
First of all, we can’t really say this is the way the law should be. We
can only say what a Restatement project can say, this is what the law is.
But there are places where we can re-craft and reframe how certain parts
of Indian law are reviewed, So, I’ve talked about other contexts, but this
is the one I want to talk about today is the trust relationship. We use the
phrase very carefully in the Restatement: “trust relationship.” This is the
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. Most people call
it the trust duty or the trust responsibility. The reporters wanted to call it
the “trust responsibility.”
Apparently, this is a fight that we could not win. We had to call it the
trust relationship. A duty, a responsibility is enforceable. We had a dearth
of cases in which a federal court, well, really the Supreme Court, holding
explicitly that the trust relationship is enforceable. Yes, you can sue the
United States for monetary damages under the Tucker Act, as we reported
in section 10 of the Restatement. Hard thing to do, and it’s extremely
difficult to force the United States to fulfill the duty of protection, i.e., its
trust responsibility.
So, we call it a trust relationship, but embedded throughout this book,
throughout this entire project are important elements that have to do with
this supposedly unenforceable legal principle. Section 4 describes what
we call in the book the general trust relationship. This is again separate
from section 10, which says: yes, you can sue the United States for money
damages, and there’s some material in there about seeking injunctions
from federal agencies from violating your trust duty itself, but the general
trust relationship is the relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes. It’s formed typically through the creation through the negotiation
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or application of a treaty or the acknowledgment by the United States or
the Department of the Interior of the continuing sovereignty of a tribal
nation. That, in short, is all it is. But if you look deeper into the history of
this relationship, you’ll see that tribes gave up an enormous amount of
lands and resources in an arm’s length negotiation with the United States
government. Unfortunately, in many respects—culture, language, our
children, and our traditions—we exchanged for this duty of protection and
a few other things too, like reservations, and, you know, lands, that sort
of thing.
But the relationship itself is really not all that well fleshed out. Nobody
really knows what it is. So, we’re trying to put some flesh into that. And
if you look at the extremely lengthy reporters’ notes for section 4, you will
see the manifestation of the duty of protection. It’s unusual for reporters’
notes in Restatement projects for the ALI to have that much material. But
the general trust relationship itself is everything. It is massive and also
very, very indeterminate.
We also included section 7(e) under the powers of Congress. Congress
actually has acquired power by virtue of its status as the protector. Or we
use the metaphor of the trustee for Indian tribes and Indian people. That
is independently a source of federal power to enact Indian affairs
legislation. Of course, there’s section 9, which says that so long as
Congress is acting to fulfill the trust relationship, then its statutes are
constitutional, even if it creates what otherwise might be considered a
racial classification.
So, if you go back to section 4, you’ll see in comments c, d, and e that
we have some big descriptions of what the duty of protection actually is
or the general trust responsibility. You have safeguarding tribal property
which is the United States’ obligation to make sure that additional Indian
lands are not lost. You have comment d preserving tribal self-government.
And it is an obligation of the United States to maintain tribal governments
and preserving lands, preserving self-determination. And then, of course,
there’s comment e, which talks a little bit about how the government
provides governmental services.
Now it’s clear from the Restatement that Congress has the power to do
all of these things. What is less clear, and something we could not
affirmatively state as black letter law, was that the United States actually
has an obligation enforceable in court to do all those things. And that’s
the future, right? There is some litigation pending where some of the
contours of that enforceable obligation are present. It’s clear tribes who
negotiated these treaties, who entered into these relationships with the
United States, firmly believe that the duty of protection is a legal
obligation that is enforced. Or should absolutely be enforceable.
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The Department of Interior, with a few blips here and there, depending
on who’s in the administration, also takes that position. Congress even
takes that position when it adopts any statute of Indian affairs in the last
half century—there is a good chance that at the beginning of that statute
is a provision that says we understand as Congress that the trust
responsibility is enforceable.
And then there’s the Department of Justice. And its position is no, the
duty of protection, the trust relationship is not enforceable. It is a purely
voluntary federal government gift. It is merely a moral obligation. Moral
obligations on a sovereign like the United States are not enforceable. The
Supreme Court, if confronted directly with these questions, and it never
really has been yet, will just more or less likely to go along with the
Department of Justice on this question.
But there are cracks in that façade. We like to think that the force of the
Restatement behind the black letter and even the comments can help undo
that position. And when I say cracks, I think probably the biggest one I’ve
seen is language from a Supreme Court decision called Cougar Den.
Which came out of your own state, Washington State, and Justice
Gorsuch. There was no majority opinion in that case. Justice Gorsuch
wrote a concurring opinion where he basically said something that is a
condemnation of the idea that the general trust responsibility or the duty
protection is unenforceable. He said when tribes negotiated Indian treaties
and they gave the lands and resources—I know here in Michigan, nobody
can ever really quantify what the value of those things are, I would say
trillions of dollars—tribes did not get nothing in exchange for that. You
get tiny little reservations, relatively speaking, some on and off
reservation treaty rights. You’ve got the sort of existence and continuing
government relationship. But in terms of pure monetary value, that’s a
pittance compared to what tribes gave up.
There has to be something else. And almost like the dark matter of the
universe, the dark matter of Indian law. And that’s I think the duty of
protection. This book is full of places where the United States does engage
in fulfilling its trust responsibility. And of course, the book could be ten
times bigger for all the places where the United States does not.
So, I come back to my metaphor of the rib. And you look at that, the
painting behind me. You see the heart, the heart berry. The démen, which
is what the heart protects and you know with any luck this material in this
Restatement will and can be used to strengthen that. To protect that notion,
and also to enhance hopefully for tribes and the people Indian people in
the United States who desperately need this assistance and who negotiated
for this protection to eventually be entitled to that.

